Summary
On 23 March 2005 explosions and fires at the BP Texas City refinery killed 15 workers and injured 180. During the startup of an isomerization unit, a distillation tower was overfilled for hours while its level instrument showed a normal reading. Relief valves discharged into an atmospheric blowdown drum and stack, liquid geysered out, and the vapour cloud ignited. We review the case with a bow-tie view, a contributing-factor map, RCM and an ISO 55001:2024 lens, and turn it into five checks.
Key findings
- Startup was authorised despite known faults in the tower level transmitter and high-level alarms.
- Overfill drove relief discharge into an atmospheric blowdown system; the tower had no automatic high-level shutdown.
- Occupied trailers were sited as close as 121 ft from the blowdown drum.
- Low personal injury rates were read as evidence of good process safety.
Treat startup as a high-risk mode: verify instruments, staff it properly, and keep people away from the unit.
Five practical checks
- Pre-startup instrument check Before every startup, confirm that level, pressure and alarm instruments on the safety-critical list have been tested, with records and a named approver.
- Mass balance during startup Track what goes in and what comes out of each vessel, shift by shift. A rising inventory with no outflow is a stop signal.
- Relief and disposal review Know where every relief valve discharges. Challenge any flammable discharge to atmosphere near people or ignition sources.
- People out of harm’s way Site occupied buildings using a documented study, and control non-essential people and vehicles near units during startups.
- Measure the barriers, not just the injuries Keep process safety indicators separate from injury rates, and link them to the barriers that prevent major accidents.
If the level on your board were wrong right now, what else would tell you?
Common questions
What happened in the Texas City refinery explosion?
On 23 March 2005 explosions and fires at the BP Texas City refinery killed 15 workers and injured 180 During the startup of an isomerization unit, a distillation tower was overfilled for hours while its level instrument showed a normal reading.
What are the main asset management lessons from the Texas City refinery explosion?
Startup was authorised despite known faults in the tower level transmitter and high-level alarms. Overfill drove relief discharge into an atmospheric blowdown system; the tower had no automatic high-level shutdown. Occupied trailers were sited as close as 121 ft from the blowdown drum. Low personal injury rates were read as evidence of good process safety.
What can a site check today?
The paper gives five checks: Pre-startup instrument check; Mass balance during startup; Relief and disposal review; People out of harm’s way; Measure the barriers, not just the injuries. Treat startup as a high-risk mode: verify instruments, staff it properly, and keep people away from the unit.
This page summarises the full paper. The PDF adds the event sequence, a bow-tie view, a contributing-factor map, an RCM table, an ISO 55001:2024 lens, illustrative indicators and the full list of sources. It is a practitioner interpretation from public sources, not legal or engineering advice.